The Political Economy of Industrialization (Job market paper)
In this paper, I propose a theory that explains why the landowning elite promoted industrialization in the second half of the 19th century. I argue that this elite strategically used public investment (e.g. railroad construction) to undermine capitalists’ support for revolution and thereby stabilize the existing political regime. Specifically, increased public investment enhanced the productivity of the industrial sector, thereby increasing capital income and augmenting capitalists’ wealth. Greater wealth among capitalists translated into heightened potential losses from redistributive policies if political power shifted to the working class, who impose higher taxes.
I show that if there is a positive probability that the working class takes power, the landowning elite can induce the capitalist to support its political regime by imposing a higher level of public investment. In addition, my theoretical framework reveals how the landowning elite could guarantee future pro-industrial economic policy without sharing political power. I support my theory with anecdotal evidence from the Second French Empire, the German Empire, and Imperial Russia.
